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Nudging the Criminal Justice System into Listening
to Crime Victims in Plea Agreements
Dana Pugach* and Michal Tamir
I. INTRODUCTION
Victims’ limited ability to compel public prosecution or to influence
the terms of plea bargains are undoubtedly among the factors contributing
to the entrenched position of plea bargains.1 The 2004 Crime Victims’
Rights Act (CVRA) 2 has given crime victims “the right to participate in
the system.”3 Specifically, it has conferred standing onto victims and
granted victims the right to express their opinion about plea bargains in
court.4 Further, the CVRA allows victims to file for a nondiscretionary
mandamus writ when their rights have been revoked.5 Filing this writ
could lead to voiding a plea or a sentence, albeit not to a retrial. How could
such a potentially explosive provision – which has been at the core of
victims’ rights advocacy and scholarship – go under the radar of the vast
scholarship analyzing the current situation of plea agreements? This article
explores the importance of victims’ participation in plea bargains, analyzes
* Associate Professor, Ph.D.; LL.M.; LL.B., Ono Academic College, Israel.
 Associate Professor, LL.D.; LL.M.; LL.B., The Academic Center of Law and
Science, Israel.
The authors want to thank Prof. Paul Cassell, Prof. Rinat Kitai-Sangero and Mr. Nadiv
Mordechai for their useful comments, and Mr. Tomer S. Stein for his great editing job. The
article was presented in the 2016 ICON-S Annual Conference, Berlin, Humboldt University.
The authors want to thank the participants of the panel “The Boundaries of the Criminal
Law” for their useful comments.
1. Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 717, 717 n.2 *2006) (mentioning the statutes giving
victims the right to participate in plea negotiations).
2. Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, Title I, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2261
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. I 2006)) [hereinafter CVRA].
3. 150 CONG. REC. S4237, S4263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein), https://www.congress.gov/crec/2004/04/22/CREC-2004-04-22-senate.pdf.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006).
5. The statute, the constitutional amendment efforts that preceded it, and a review of
state constitutions, are discussed in Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’
Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 255, 350–54 (2005); Paul G.
Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 4 UTAH L. REV. 861, 865–70 (2007).
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the obstacles to its fulfillment, and suggests a way to overcome at least
some of its major hurdles.
In recent years, the criminal justice system has changed dramatically in
numerous respects. First, plea agreements have grown to become the rule
in the criminal justice system (CJS), rather than trials.6 Ultimately, the
courts have started to realize the importance of regulating pleas, in as much
as defendants’ rights were concerned.7 Second, victims’ rights have been
recognized and enshrined in a growing body of legislation, from state
constitutions to federal laws, including far-reaching participation rights in
pleabargaining.8 Due to the dominance of plea agreements in the criminal
justice process, the importance of victims’ rights in plea agreements has
become pivotal. The more prevalent plea agreements are, the more
relevant they are to the victims’ lives, rights, and the fulfillment of those
rights.
While victims’ rights scholarship has emphasized this right, the ample
literature and case law regarding plea agreements have largely ignored the
victims’ situation in plea agreements. This is true for both before the
enactment of the 2004 CVRA and after it.9 Pleas have become more
visible, but the victims still remain hidden. Despite criticism directed at the
control of prosecutors’ and defendants’ control over the process, victims’
involvement has seldom been discussed as a remedy. Notable examples of
referring to victims’ rights under a general assessment of the CJS include
Fletcher’s seminal book from 199510 and Bibas’ more recent call to include
victims in the process.11
Furthermore, Supreme Court decisions that started shaping plea
agreements have focused on defendant’s rights, but in doing so, they

6. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1485-86 n. 13 (2010). Statistics of the change between 1945 and 2010: Sourcebook of
criminal justice statistics Online, Table 5.22.2010,
http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf; Mike Work, Creating Constitutional Procedure: Frye,
Lafler, and Plea Bargaining Reform, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 458 (2014); for a
comparative brief review, see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Economic Analysis of PleaBargaining and Prosecution, CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (N. Garoupa ed., Edward
Elgar Pub.), June 29, 2009, at 148–49; In 1995, Fletcher commented that 90 percent of the
cases were disposed of consensually, without trial.
7. For history and analysis see, Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining
Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011).
8. For more information on the ascendance of victims’ interests, see Douglas E. Beloof
& Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victims’ Right to Attend the Trial: The Reascendent National
Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2005).
9. See Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective
Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1412 (2003) (criticizing Bibas’ stance).
10. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 189 (Addison Wesley Pub., 1995).
11. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 152–153 (Oxford U. Press,
1st ed., 2012) (discussing the benefits of including victims in plea agreement negotiations in
general terms).
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ignored victims and their statutory rights.12 It may be presumed, then, that
the potentially revolutionary statutory victims’ rights have not been
exercised by many victims, and that the right to file for mandamus has not
proved to be the anticipated effective means of ensuring compliance it was
expected to be.13
This article identifies the common ground between two bodies of legal
thinking — the vast literature analyzing and criticizing plea agreements and
the research concerning victims’ rights. The article begins by offering
justifications for victims’ rights participation in plea agreements, which can
be based on intrinsic as well as instrumental arguments.
These
justifications are broadly classified into two categories: the benefit of
participation to the victim and the benefit to the society and the CJS.
Consequently, victims’ participation will be advanced in this article as a
remedy for many of the ills identified by the critics of plea agreements.
Although such strong justifications may well lead to a call for a major legal
change, which reflects a strong governmental duty to victims, this article
stays within the bounds of the current legal situation.14 The article
continues by suggesting solutions to the possible structural reasons for the
failure of this right to be materialized.
The methodology embodied in this article utilizes nudge theory, which
involves choice architecture, and has rarely been applied to criminal law.
Behavioral psychology literature recognizes that the framework in which
an individual confronts a decision can significantly influence her decision.
Nudge theory fits within this framework. A nudge is any aspect of the
choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way
without forbidding any options or significantly changing people’s freedom
of choice.15 We claim that the vast discretion allocated to the repeat players
in the CJS, on the one hand, and the time constraints that make the players
resort to the default decisions, on the other hand — make the nudge theory
particularly suitable to the framework of plea bargains. The nudges require
decision makers to make choices instead of resorting to a familiar default
option.16 Nudge theory may be of particular importance when actors have
yet to internalize changes (victims’ rights, in our case), and continue to
resort to their default actions. Thus, changing the default rule may
contribute to a more careful execution of duties. In accordance with this
theory, we suggest a nudge toolbox — a toolbox that includes

12. Work, supra note 6, at 484-86; Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and
Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 151 (2012) (reviewing Supreme Court
decisions).
13. See Beloof, supra note 5, at 350–54 (2005) (terming the right “cutting edge”).
14. Some of the more profound proposals will be mentioned here. E.g., Cassell, supra
note 5.
15. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 8 (Yale University Press. eds., 2008).
16. Id. at 74.
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organizational and regulatory nudge solutions. This toolbox will affect all
the relevant participants in the CJS. The advantage to this is that the
suggestions leave the prosecutor’s and the judge’s discretion intact, while
at the same time producing a nudge not to go directly to the default
decision (i.e., swift sealing of plea agreements). The possible results of
these proposals are far reaching and include an effect on the earlier stages
of the criminal process that is in line with the current criticism of the plea
agreements machinery.
Chapter 1 presents the normative and practical background to the
victims’ place in plea agreement. Chapter 2 elaborates on the victims’
rights to participate in plea agreements. In this regard it discusses two
categories of justifications: (1) benefits to the victim, and (2) benefit to the
CJS and to society. Chapter 3 provides and argues for a new framework to
address these concerns. The chapter begins by presenting some of the
previous suggestions for how to best structure victims’ role in plea
agreements.
Second, the chapter presents nudge theory and its
compatibility to plea bargains. Lastly, the chapter introduces the idea of
creating a nudge toolbox in order to nudge CJS participants into allowing
victims’ participation in plea agreements. Chapter 4 translates the nudge
theory into a practical toolbox. Our basic suggestions are first, a rule that
ensures that the process is fully documented by the prosecutor; and second,
a default rule to which a judge will deliver a decision only after reviewing
this document. These proposals are designed to induce greater deliberation
by CJS participants, which would in turn lead to a genuine discussion,
without abolishing their discretion and freedom of choice. The chapter
considers and discusses a few possible counterarguments. Chapter 5
provides concluding remarks.

II. VICTIMS’ PLACE IN CJS – NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL
BACKGROUND
At the base of victims’ rights rests a new reading of the relationship
between the victim and the state.17 It says that while people have entrusted
the state with the power to investigate, prosecute and punish, this monopoly
does not entail the complete erosion of the private harm. On the contrary,
it is the state’s duty to uphold human rights, including those of the victim.18
This new view of the adversary system turns the bipolar criminal process
into a more complicated, often three-sided process that includes the victim.

17. Liliya Abramchayev, A Social Contract Argument for the State’s Duty to Protect
from Private Violence, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. OF C.R. & ECON. DEV. 849, 853, 863 (2004); Mary
Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, The Crime Victims’
Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to Be Reasonably Protected from the Accused, 78 TENN.
L. REV. 47, 52 (2010).
18. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, Ch. 4 (N.Y. U. Press 2002).
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Both state and federal legislation have recognized the victims’
legitimate interest in plea agreements. Different mechanisms of victims’
participation have been installed in different states and in the Federal
system. The victims’ right to participate in plea bargains includes two
components: the right to confer with the prosecutor during the plea
bargaining and the right to address the court before the entering of the
plea.19 O’Hear considered the duty of a prosecutor to consult with the
victim a more meaningful victim participation than would be available
through a right to speak at the plea hearing alone, as the right to express a
view during a plea hearing would be too latent to be effective.20 However,
presently, it is not at all clear that a right to confer would lead to a genuine
discussion.21
Statutory victims’ rights of participation in pleas vary widely from state
to state. The preliminary right to confer with the prosecutor, for example,
could either be discretionary or mandatory,22 and may include notification
only,23 or a general right to confer.24 However, the rights may be broadly
divided into five distinct modes of participation beyond the right to be
informed: a right to confer with the prosecutor, a mandatory consultation
requirement, a right to address the court (in person or in writing), and the
federal right to appeal for a writ of mandamus where these rights have been
breached.25 Several states have even set the rights as constitutional.26
Importantly, the prosecution’s discretion remains intact in all cases, as it is
not required to defer to the victims’ wishes. Generally, few procedural
guidelines regarding the prosecutor’s responsibilities to confer with the
victim are included in these types of state laws, leaving their
implementation largely at the discretion of the prosecutor.27 In addition,
most states provide no consequences for noncompliance with such laws;

19. For variations on the prosecutor’s duty to consult the victim see: BELOOF, CASSELL,
TWIST, infra note 56, at 422.
20. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines.,
91 MARQUETTE L REV. 323, 324 (2007).
21. ANDREW SANDERS, RICHARD YOUNG & MANDY BURTON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 739
(Oxford U. Press, 4th ed. 2010).
22. As proposed in the 1992 Model Victims of Crime Act, National Conference of
Commissioner on Uniform State Law, § 203 (1992), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/victims%20of%20crime/uvca_final_92.pdf%20;
www.Americanbar.org/groups/criminal_Justice/policy/index_aba_Criminal_Justice_policies
_by_meeting.html (announcing the adoption of the model law by the American Bar
Association (ABA), 108C (CJS).).
23. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 611A.03 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3436, 74-7333
(2000).
24. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 971.095 (2000).
25. For a full review of laws, see OVC Archive, OVC.COM, (Nov. 2002) https://www.
ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin7/2.html#go4.
26. BELOOF, et al., infra note 56, at 422.
27. OVC Archive, OVC.COM, (Nov. 2002) https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives
/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin7/2.html#go4.
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crime victims are still frequently left out of the plea agreement process.28
As implementation of victims’ rights in plea bargains changes among the
different states, this article concentrates on the federal rights.29
In the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), Congress has
explicitly provided victims’ rights accompanied by standing.30 Victims, as
participants, albeit not parties, have the rights to receive notice and “to be
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving
release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.”31 The court “shall
ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in subsection
(a)” and shall make every effort to “permit the fullest attendance possible
by the victim . . ..”32 Prosecution and other department of justice agencies
“shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and
accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).”33 Moreover, the victim
may submit, and thus become a party to, a motion for relief and writ of
mandamus, enforcing his rights in appellate court when his rights are
denied by the trial court.34 In certain cases, the victim may make a motion
to re-open a plea or a sentence.35 This right is not a right to veto the plea or
that the prosecution should defer to her wishes.36 However, that victims
should be granted an opportunity to express their views, without an
opportunity to challenge any court decision, goes further than previous
scholarly suggestions.37 Theoretically, the victims’ right to appeal for a
mandamus could have presented a significant opportunity for judicial
review. Expectations of victims’ rights supporters have focused on the
enforceability of the right, embodied in the resurrected writ of mandamus,
as a remedy for rights violations.38
For various reasons, some victims may not be interested in
participating in the criminal process. Yet, other victims may be satisfied
with their participation and the fulfillment of their rights. However, the
current normative composition does not seem to be optimal for those
victims who do not materialize their rights for lack of information or
resources, or because CJS professionals still seem to turn to their default
action of reaching pleas and sealing them without the victims’ input. It

28. Id.
29. For an early review of victims’ rights in plea bargains and different state models, see
Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L. Q. 301 (1987).
30. S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2004) (enacted).
31. CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006).
32. Id. § 3771(b)(1).
33. Id. § 3771(c). For a narrow reading of this provision, see United States v. McVeigh,
958 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1997).
34. 18 U.S.C § 3771(d)(3).
35. Id. § 3771(d)(5).
36. Courts have stressed that the CVRA does not transfer discretion to the victims. See
e.g., United States v. Thetford, 935 F.Supp.2d 1280 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
37. Welling, supra note 29, at 355.
38. Beloof, supra note 5, at 262, 343.
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may, of course, reflect the possibility that not all authorities have
internalized the changes that stem from victims’ rights. The often
unrepresented lay victim would normally assume that the prosecutor would
notify the court their her view.39 Economic analysis of rights can also
explain why most victims would find vindicating the right extremely
difficult. The cost of vindicating the right would be prohibitively
expensive for most victims who would have to hire an attorney to work
alongside the prosecution and the defense attorney.40 This theory explains
why at least some of the cases where victims sought mandamus involved
either the prospect of high restitution, or victims who had the means to
petition, which may include corporations or multiple victims.41
Judges may also view victims’ rights as an unnecessary obstacle.
Judge Posner recently observed that allowing victims to intervene in
criminal cases in the district court:
. . . would be a recipe for chaos. Imagine plea bargaining in which
intervening crime victims argue for a different bargain from that
struck between the government and the defendant, or trials at
which victims’ lawyers present witnesses and cross-examine the
defendant's witnesses or participate in the sentencing hearing in
order to persuade the judge to impose a harsher sentence than
suggested by the prosecutor.42
Moreover, the lack of sufficient scholarly writings discussing the
CVRA, as well as the few published cases that have reached the courts of
appeal, demonstrate the little influence the CVRA provisions relevant to
victims’ rights in plea bargains have had. This problem is the heart of this
article, due to the importance of victims’ participation in plea agreements,
which will be discussed in the next chapter.

39. Cassell, supra note 5, at 889.
40. The prosecution and the defense both have a litigation-cost advantage over the
victim. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA.
L. REV. 1313 (2012).
41. Most of the published petitions for mandamus published in the last five years comply
with this observation. See, e.g., In re Her Majesty the Queen in Right Of Canada. v. U.S.
District Court, 785 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d
1234 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Stake Center Locating, Inc. v. U.S. District Court. 731 F.3d 949
(9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Citgo Ref. & Chemicals Co., 893 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D.
Tex. 2012); United States v. BP Products N. Am., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655 (S.D. Tex. 2009);
United States v. Arctic Glacier International, Inc., http://www.appliedantitrust.com/
03_criminal/restitution/arctic_sdohio_vr_baron_objections2_1_2010.pdf. The petition for
writ of mandamus was denied; See https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/ 2978860/unitedstates-v-arctic-glacier-international/?q=cites%3A(1231213).
42. United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2013).
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION IN
PLEA AGREEMENTS
The many justifications of victims’ involvement in plea agreements can
be based on either intrinsic or instrumental arguments, and may be broadly
classified into two categories: the benefit of participation to the victim, and
the benefit to the CJS and society.
A. THE BENEFITS TO THE VICTIMS
The effect of a plea agreement on the particular victim is almost selfexplanatory. Plea agreements are essentially either a dismissal or reduction
of charges, with a presumably more lenient sentence than the defendant
might have expected without the agreement. All these may be major
changes for a victim who may expect adherence to charges that reflect
reality as she see it, followed by a certain standard of sentencing. Nothing
could be farther from this expectation than a non-prosecution agreement
with an alleged perpetrator.43 A victim is likely to be interested in the finer
points of indictment and sentence, not only in the simplistic bipolarization
of acquittal versus conviction. For example, for a victim of multiple sexual
offenses, certain charges may be more meaningful than others that may be
dropped, and restitution may be more important than long term
imprisonment. It was recently recognized by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal that the interests of a victim and the government in a restitution
determination are not sufficiently similar for a finding of privity” for
purposes of collateral estoppel.44 Furthermore, a plea agreement may have
far reaching civil consequences for a victim who wishes to pursue
damages, or where criminal proceedings may affect family court
decisions.45 Hence, victims’ advocates have stressed the importance of
participation in plea agreements since the rise of modern victims’ rights
advocacy.46
Varied justifications support victims’ participation in all key
proceedings, including plea bargains, in order to advance victims’ needs
and interests.47 As Cassell and Tribe wrote: “[t]hese are the very kinds of
43. A victim’s status has been recognized under the CVRA in this situation: Doe v.
United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Courts have also recognized victims’
CVRA rights where prosecutions have not yet started.Does v. United States, 817 F. Supp.
2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
44. Doe v. Hasketh, 828 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2016) (It was consequently found that the
victim could file for civil damages. The victim was not a party to prior criminal sentencing
proceeding, and had limited opportunity to influence process. Her participation in restitution
process was limited to conferring with government, providing information to probation
officer as to extent of her losses, or providing testimony to sentencing court if sentencing
court determined that testimony was warranted.).
45. Id.
46. William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The
Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976); Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the
Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 515, 557 (1982).
47. The question whether rights should be limited to victims of serious offences is
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rights with which our Constitution is typically and properly concerned —
rights of individuals to participate in all those government processes that
strongly affect their lives.”48 Due to the vast potential of plea agreements
to affect the victims’ wellbeing, victim participation is doubly justified. In
turn, however, exclusion of the victim may lead to what is known as
“secondary victimization,” that is, the harm caused to the victim by the
CJS’s lack of respect and consideration.49 As early as 1977, Christie
portrayed victims as “double losers,” by “losing” to the offender and by
“losing” to a system that denies their rights of participation, which robs
them of “their” conflict.50 Thus, it is not surprising that research has
indicated the harmful effect on victims who had been excluded from plea
bargains.51 The participation of the victim in the plea agreement has an
ability to restore the dignity of the victim, while protecting her against
unjust manipulation or secondary victimization.52 Indeed, the right to be
heard on pleas has been connected to the CVRA’s open ended requirement
that victims “be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's
dignity and privacy.”53 A right of participation conveys vindication and
moral recognition not only of the damage but also of the victim’s emotional
needs, which is of particular importance where retributivism is upheld.54
Thus, listening to the victim means hearing her authentic concerns without
pre-guising her stance. Indeed, not all victims would necessarily push for a
harsh sentence.55
beyond the scope of this article. “Implementation of this section is particularly important in
serious cases: all felonies, crimes of violence, and other cases were a victim’s wellbeing is
an on-going concern.” As proposed in the 1992 MODEL UNIFORM VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT, S.
203. http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/victims%20of%20crime/uvca_final_92.pdf;
www.Americanbar.org/groups/criminal_Justice/policy/index_aba_Criminal_Justice_policies
_by_meeting.html.
48. Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the
Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, reprinted in DOUGLAS E. BELLOG, PAUL G. CASSELL
& STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 776–78 (2d ed. 2006).
49. Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, UTAH L. REV. 289, 295–297 (1999).
50. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1977).
51. Edna Erez, Peter R. Ibarra & Daniel M. Downs, Victim Welfare and Participation
Reforms in the United States: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, in THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 15
(Edna Erez, Michael Kildhling & Jo-Anne Wemmers eds., 2011).
52. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 189, 192.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (2006); Cassell, supra note 5, at 886–91.
54. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 197. For a rejection of the notion of “private vengeance”
as a factor, and the link between legitimate victims’ emotions and retribution, see Stephanos
Bibas, Criminal (In)justice and Democracy in America, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 134, 140
(2013); Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Dana Pugach, Pain, Love and Voice: The Role of
Domestic Violence Victims in Sentencing, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 423 (2012). For a brief
presentation of the debate about retributivism between classical economic analysis of law
and social analysis, see Mark D. White, Retributivist Justice and Dignity, in LAW AND
SOCIAL ECONOMICS, ESSAYS IN ETHICAL VALUES FOR THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY, 77,
78–85 (Mark D. White ed., 2014).
55. Dancig-Rosenberg & Pugach, supra note 54.
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A closely related line of justifications points to the participation’s
possible contribution to a victims’ recovery.56 Theoretic support of this
assumption may be found in therapeutic jurisprudence theory, which
identified the legal process as a potentially therapeutic agent for its
audiences. A major tenet of this theory has been the need to hear the
victim. Hearing the victim is a vindicating, empowering act, which
restores a sense of control after it has been damaged by the offense.57
Recently, positive victimology has also stressed the positive effect the
participatory legal process may have for crime victims, while identifying
exclusion as a negative factor.58 Participation could lead to greater victim
satisfaction within the criminal justice system.59 Procedural justice writers
have identified transparency, clear criteria, and participation as factors
affecting the parties’ satisfaction with the legal process.60 Procedural
justice theory may explain the finding that victims’ involvement in pleas
does not necessarily complicate or prolong the process.61 Moreover, as
early research found, the vast majority of involved victims accepted the
sentence agreement.62 It may be, of course, that victims who are consulted
are simply more informed about the process and its probable outcomes,
including the legal reasons for the bargain, so their expectations are more
realistic.63 These findings also resonate with a view of plea bargains as a
form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), as mediation or a
dialogue.64 If plea bargains are viewed as a “privatization” of criminal
56. DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 423 (3d. ed., 2010).
57. DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Edna Erez, Michael Kildhling & Jo-Anne
Wemmers, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victim Participation in Justice: An Introduction,
in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ix (Edna Erez, Michael Kildhling & Jo-Anne Wemmers eds., 2011).
58. Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Dana Pugach, Between Secondary Victimization and
Positive Victimology: The Case of Crime Victims’ Right of Privacy, in POSITIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 292–306 (Natti Ronel & Dana Segev eds., 2015).
59. Model Uniform Victims of Crime Act, supra note 47, at 14 (§ 203 cmt.).
60. Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule
Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307 (2006). Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and
Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 444 (2008); Giannini, supra note 17, at 85–103.
61. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS
OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 213 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds.,
2003).
62. Karen Gorbach Rebrovich, Factors Affecting the Plea-Bargaining Process in Erie
County: Some Tentative Findings, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 693 (1976-1977). See also, Wayne A.
Krestetter & Anne M. Heinz, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in
Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 365 (1979).
63. BELOOF, et. al., supra note 56.
64. For an analysis of plea bargains as a “privatized” ADR, see Gabriel Hallevy, The
Defense Attorney as Mediator in Plea Bargains, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 495, 499 (2009);
Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Plea Bargaining as Dialogue, 49 AKRON L. REV. 63 (2016). While
Hallevy and Kitai-Sangero pointed at the benefits of plea bargains as resolution for
defendants, the same would apply to victims ù they will be better included, considered, and
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justice, or as ADR with little judicial control, there is a strong justification
to include all those who have stakes in the result, including the victims.
Victims’ participation may also be justified by the theory of
sentencing. There is a wide agreement that the victim has a particular stake
at sentencing, following not only from her own interest, but from the
principle of linking the appropriate sentence to the level of harm, which is
often the victims’ private information.65 This principle has been reflected
not only in the CVRA but also in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended in 2008. It provided that “[b]efore imposing sentence, the
court must address any victim of the crime who is present at sentencing and
must permit the victim to be reasonably heard.”66 Furthermore, it is
reflected in state constitutions and statutory schemes, which contain the
victims’ right to have input in sentencing proceedings.67 In Payne v.
Tennessee, the Court recognized crime victims as unique individual human
beings whose particularized harm could be the legitimate subject of victim
impact statements.68 Moreover, three concurring Justices — Scalia,
O’Connor and Kennedy — acknowledged the ascendance of crime victims’
interests in America.69 Another judicial acknowledgment of victims’
interest in sentencing may be found in Calderon v. Thompson, where the
Court observed that to unsettle expectations in the execution of moral
judgment “is to inflict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate
interests in punishing the guilty, an interest shared by the State and victims
of crime alike.”70 Defendants’ claims of victims’ statements as prejudicial
rather than relevant have been rejected.71 In fact, many victims avail
themselves of their right to submit a victim impact statement.72
their dignity will be respected.
65. Nuno Garoupa, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Law § 4.4 (2003), http://www
.ppge.ufrgs.br/giacomo/arquivos/diremp/garoupa-2004.pdf. For a different opinion, see
FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 247–48 (contending that a victim’s opinion in relation to
sentencing is not to be taken into consideration in determining the proper level of
punishment, as punishment does not respond to a particular wrong as measured by the
victim. Nevertheless, arguing that the victim’s power should be reallocated from sentencing
to pleabargaining).
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h)(i)(4)(B).
67. Beloof, supra note 49, at 328–29 (App. A. Collecting rights from state jurisdictions).
Victim Impact Statements have become prevalent. A separate question is whether a victim
can express a view about the befitting sentence. For the debate, see Annette van der
Merwe & Ann Skelton, Victims’ Mitigating Views in Sentencing Decisions: A Comparative
Analysis, 35 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 355, 357–59 (2015); Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of
Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 611 (2009).
68. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809 (1991).
69. For more information on the ascendance of victims’ interests, see Beloof & Cassell,
supra note 8.
70. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, at 556 (1998) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 421 (1993) (O’Connor, J. concurring).
71. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1007 (1999) (citing Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 589, 613 (C.D. Cal.
1992), aff’d, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995)) (“The devastating effects that the deaths of the
victims had on their families and loved ones is ‘certainly part and parcel of the
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The link between plea agreements and sentencing is obvious.73 Any
plea, whether a charge or sentencing bargain, is likely to offer the
defendant concessions. Pleas are one place where the state’s interest in
timely punishment may be different then that of the victim, which leads to
the importance of recognizing the separate interests. Victims’ interests
may be “profoundly injured” not only when execution of the sentence is
significantly delayed, but when the charge or the sentence is significantly
different to the anticipated one, and the victim is not informed about the
reasons for it or able to express her view. When a predetermined sentence
is being agreed upon through the plea — it essentially turns the plea
agreement into a sentencing proceeding less transparent and participatory
than the one taking place in the courtroom. Thus, recognition of the
legitimacy of victims’ interest in sentencing adds yet another justification
to victims’ involvement in pleas.74 For example, a victim should be able to
express her monetary concerns where restitution may be an option.75 Not
allowing the victim to express her view about the plea will impair her right
to address the court at sentencing.76 Not only that, she will also not be able
to appeal the sentence as she was not a party to the criminal proceedings, a
fact that may lead to either frustration or lengthy and costly civil
proceedings which could have been avoided.77
One could argue, that there is a notable difference between sentencing
and plea agreements. A sentence is delivered after the defendant has been
found guilty. That is, the victim has been judicially recognized as a victim.
In contrast, a plea agreement is a preliminary process, whereby the victim
is still an alleged victim; therefore, her rights should be defined more
cautiously. Recognizing a victim’s stake in sentencing is easier than
recognizing participation in earlier stages, as it follows a conviction and the
presumption that innocence no longer applies.78 However, if victims’
participation is left to that late stage of the criminal trial, it may be too late,
circumstances’ of the crime properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase of trial.”).
72. Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SENT’G
REP. 5, 9 (2006). For a victim’s fight to submit victim impact statements, see, United States
v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
73. See BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 56, at 423 (contending that the right to
express a view in plea bargaining is implicit in the right for an input in sentencing).
74. Cassell, supra note 5, at 938–41.
75. BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 56, at 423. Restitution is the one component
of the sentence that reflects mostly the victim’s interests. With its growing importance, an
early victim’s involvement in a plea may reflect it and lead to a more balanced plea. It may
also contribute to greater defendant’s realism and prevent cases such as California v.
Ramirez, where the defendant, on appeal, was afforded an opportunity to withdraw from a
plea and although restitution was not part of the plea, it was imposed by the court. California
v. Ramirez, No. C068462, 2012 WL 1919481, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 29, 2012).
Unsurprisingly, restitution is very much the only victims’ rights issue that has have been
decided by the Supreme Court. See Paroline v. United States, 701 F. 3d 749.
76. People v. Stringham, 206 Cal. App. 3d 184, 196–97 (1988).
77. Doe v. Hasketh, 828 F.3d at 159.
78. Dancig-Rosenberg & Pugach, supra note 54, at 425, 428–42 (2012).
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considering the deciding role of the plea agreement. Clearly, the power
that could make a difference in the life of victims lies at the beginning of
the process, before an agreement has been accepted and sealed.79 Allowing
the victim to express her view in relation to sentencing, only after a plea
has been accepted, will deplete victims’ rights of much of its contents. In
this case, the victim’s view will have to refer to the fictitious reality often
portrayed in the charge bargain or an agreed upon lenient sentence. A late
objection may be met by the possible obstacle of double jeopardy. The
immediateness of the mandamus allows for it.80 In addition, it has been
argued that a trial outcome could better approximate the level of harm than
a settlement between the criminal and the prosecutor.81 Victims’
involvement may contribute to this approximation, if it affects the
negotiations between prosecution and defendant.
B. THE BENEFITS TO CJS AND TO SOCIETY
Victims’ participation in plea bargaining may also be beneficial to the
CJS and even to society. The effect of victims’ participation might be an
answer to some criticism against plea bargains. In the years that have
passed since Justice White’s remarks in Brady v. United States where he
praised plea bargains as serving everybody’s interests, criticism has grown
in line with pleas’ dominance over the criminal process.82 Much of the
criticism emanates from leaving what Bibas called “the shadow of the
trial”, and looking into the realities of plea bargains.83 However, little
attention has been drawn to the possible effect of victims’ participation in
plea agreements as a safeguard against some of the shortcomings of this
procedure.
In line with the Procedural Justice Theory, victims’ participation may
enhance perception of the fairness of an official decision, an issue often
raised in relation to defendants.84 In turn, this perception may contribute to
the public view of the legitimacy of the CJS as a whole, spreading from the
victim to the public. Ultimately, it might even have an effect on
cooperation and compliance.85 As plea bargains already suffer from public
distrust, undermining the CJS’s legitimacy is a point of particular

79. FLETCHER, supra note 52, at 248.
80. For analysis and cases, see Beloof supra note 5, at 309–16.
81. Garoupa, supra note 65.
82. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1033 (2006).
83. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464 (2004). See also Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in
Federal Criminal Law, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 87–97, 134–37 (2005) (speaking about the
coercion inherent in plea agreements and the prosecution’s discretion that lead to distortion
of justice).
84. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 749, 772, 793, 804 (2006).
85. MODEL UNIFORM VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT, supra note 47, at 14 (§ 203 cmt.).
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importance.86 Dissatisfied victims, those who feel betrayed and neglected
by the CJS, who suffer “secondary victimization,” have been known to turn
to the media to voice their concerns/plead their case.87 This, in turn, might
lead to a greater loss of public trust in the CJS flowing from the secrecy of
the bargain. Furthermore, a frustrated victim conveys to the public a strong
message about the immorality in the justice system. If morality is an issue,
and we believe it is, victims should be heard meaningfully heard.88
At the very basic level, in many cases, the victim has the potential to
supply information. It has been claimed that a prosecutorial approach to
plea agreements is based on seeing the system as a whole and trying to
maximize resources in order to further purposes, including deterrence.89
The victim brings the angle that focuses on the details of the particular
case. She may thus illuminate points that may have escaped the prosecutor.
Another possible benefactor of the victim’s involvement may then be the
defendant, whose resistance may be penetrated after hearing the victim’s
point of view.90 As the court held in U.S. v. B.P. Products, “[i]t is also true
. . . that resourceful input from victims and their attorneys could facilitate
the reaching of an agreement.”91
However, the victim’s contribution might be even more meaningful. In
a system controlled by the prosecution, and to a point the defense counsel,
the victim’s review of the agreement may be crucial as a welcomed
contribution. Furthermore, it has been pointed that judges typically lack
sufficient information to make an informed decision about the defendant’s
guilt.92 As victims sometimes claim, the prosecution and the defense hold
the evidentiary materials and present a selective set of the facts.93
Information may be deliberately withheld by prosecution and defense, both
of whom are interested in a prompt resolution.94 The basic adversarial
86. Sergio Herzog, Plea Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public Support?, 50
CRIME & DELINQ. 590, 590–91 (2004). BELOOF, et al., supra note 56, at 423.
87. Wright, supra note 83, at 80–81.
88. Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2003). Beloof, supra note 5.
89. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. OF LEGAL
STUDIES 289 (1983). Easterbrook justified prosecutorial discretion by economic analysis as
a means of allowing prosecutors to maximize deterrence under limited resources.
90. A similar idea was suggested by Bibas who regarded eading of the trial as a morality
play, conveying moral messages. See Bibas, supra note 88, at 1431 (2003).
91. United States v. Kaufman, Slip Copy, 2008 WL 3142561 (D. New London)
http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/syllabi/gorsuch/United%20States%20v.%20Kaufman.p
acket.pdf; BP, supra note 41. (finding that there was a pre-charge conferral right and that it
had been violated, but a remedy was not granted).
92. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2122 (1998).
93. See Victims’ Objections to Plea Agreement and Request that it be Rejected in United
States v. Arctic Glacier Int’l, Inc., supra note 41.
94. A question that is not within the scope of the current article is whether the victim
should have a right to review the evidentiary material prior to expressing a view about a plea
so that the victim may give an informed opinion. For a discussion of information
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presumption that the contest between the parties leads to the truth could
very well be revoked.95 As Sanders, Young, and Burton stated, “the search
for truth (whoever’s version that may be) is subordinated to other priorities;
thus the system is exclusionary to both the defendant and the victim.”96
The victim may offer the judge another source of information and a
different perspective before the plea is sealed. This aspect is particularly
important in a system where the judge has no direct access to relevant
information.97 That is not to say that the judge should accept any victim’s
statement. However, it may lead the judge to require further information
from the prosecution before sealing the plea, leading the judge to not
automatically resort to the default option of accepting the plea. Perhaps it
could lead to a shift, even if only slightly, towards accuracy and away from
dishonest pleas.98 If there is a public interest in the truth, victims’
participation may contribute to getting closer to the truth.
The victim may possibly be taking upon herself the crucial feature of
defense attorneys in the adversarial system, according to Schulhofer, to
“sow doubt” about all aspects of the legal system.99 The prosecution will
then face the need to defend the bargain, not just present it to the judge. In
this, our view adds to those scholars who have claimed that judges should
take a more active role in plea bargains as a means of minimizing their ills,
often argued from an economic analysis point of view.100 It also fits with
the view of judges’ participation as a form of mediation.101 It has even
been suggested that, in certain cases, it is the public that has a special
interest in knowing facts, beyond the “monosyllabic guilty plea.”102
It means that the vast criticism directed at the prosecutions almost
unhindered discretion is very important to this argument.103 This discretion
asymmetry, see Bibas, supra note 83, at 2494–95. For a review of disclosure in the context
of pleas, see Bibas, supra note 7, at 1133–35.
95. For the debate about the “truth finding” capability of the adversary system, see Gary
Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118, 121–24 (1987).
96. SANDERS, YOUNG & BURTON, supra note 21, at 743.
97. Usually, the factual basis is supplied by the prosecution, sometimes even when the
defendant denies it. Ross, supra note 1, at 721. In certain cases, for example sexual offences
cases, the victim may have more information than in others, such as homicide cases, where
family members are not always witnesses.
98. For accuracy as a neglected value in a plea bargains driven system, see Bibas, supra
note 90, at 1426.
99. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1104
(1984).
100. See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295
(2006) (supporting a partial ban where a judge could forbid a plea in weaker cases); Bibas,
supra note 83, at 2542.
101. Gazal-Ayal & Riza, supra note 6, at 165.
102. Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the
Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 576 (1996).
103. Strengthened by the lack of compulsory prosecution, an issue beyond the scope of the
current article. For a brief comparative review of prosecution’s discretion, see Gazal-Ayal &
Riza, supra note 6, at 145, 146–47.
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is strengthened by the fact that, under the current regime, when presented
with a plea, the judge does not take part in the bargaining.104 The judge
may look at the factual basis of the plea, and whether the defendant entered
it knowingly and voluntarily, but not more than that.105 Federal trial courts’
judges have a broad discretion to accept or reject a negotiated plea
bargain.106 However, even looking at the factual basis may be a
considerable task, when lacking information. This situation is strengthened
by the fact that judges, too, may be interested in quick settlements rather
than long trials.107 Hence, pleas are usually accepted. Pleas are agreed to
far away from public scrutiny, without transparency and the advantages of
a public hearing, where their justification in court is minimal. Criticism
has been directed from defendants’ point of view as well, as the defendant
has the option to go to trial. However, that is a risk, considering that, if
found guilty, he may be sentenced more harshly.108 Even worse, this
discretion put an enormous burden on the appellant, should she decide to
appeal.109
This kind of discretionary justice may be seen as ‘opportunism’ and the
idea offends the rule of law.110 Furthermore, the lack of structural
oversight means that prosecutors perform a quasi-judicial role unreviewed,
de facto abolishing the separation of powers. As Barkow put it, “the
potential for arbitrary enforcement is high” with more potential for harming
rights in criminal law than in administrative law.111 In the criminal process,
the prosecution’s power is the most threatening, Barkow’s argument
emphasizes the need to rethink the prosecution’s discretion in pleas.112
Barkow has asserted this from a point of view stressing defendant’s rights,
but it can easily be applied to victims’ rights as well. Perhaps, even more
poignantly, due to the weaker position of victims in the process. To this
argument we may add Mashaw’s proposal that administrative decisions
104. Albert Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059 (1976).
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1)-(3); Barkow, supra note 82, at 1026; Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
106. FED. R. CRIM. P. It has been decided that the rule does not contravene a judge’s
discretion to reject a plea, nor does it define the criteria for acceptance or rejection. US v.
Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
107. Gazal-Ayal & Riza, supra note 6, at 165. An early research found that in the English
CJS, too, defendants were pressurized to plead guilty: JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL
MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES TO PLEAD GUILTY 45, 103 (1977).
108. Barkow, supra note 82 at 1027.
109. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458, 464 (1996).
110. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 191.
111. Barkow, supra note 82, at 1027. For the advantages of applying administrative rules
on the CJS, see also Michal Tamir, Public Law as a Whole and Normative Duality:
Reclaiming Administrative Insights in Enforcement Review, 12 TEX. J. ON CIV. LIBR. & CIV.
RTS. 43-99 (2006) (demonstrating by the test case of selective enforcement and racial
profiling).
112. A bigger problem may be posed by a prosecutorial decision not to press charges, but
that is beyond the scope of the current article.
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should be assessed by their impact on the participants, not only by their
“reasonableness.”113 Mashaw’s dignitary theory, when applied to victims,
would mean that prosecution’s use of its discretion should be criticized
when it harms the victim’s interest unjustifiably.
Another aspect of plea bargains that may benefit from victims’
involvement is the agency problem of elected and nonelected prosecutors
— the misrepresentation of public interests.114 Fletcher argues that the
undefined “interest of the state” is exaggerate and that it is often reduced to
the prosecution’s immediate needs or even the prosecutor’s personal
political needs.115 As prosecutors’ private and political interests may affect
their position in plea agreements, victims’ interests may sometimes align
closer with those of the public.116 As when considering the agreement, the
judge should act in the public’s interest. Victims’ participation — as
another form of checks and balances — may contribute to a greater
adherence to public interest. Along the same lines, O’Hear argued that
victim participation in plea bargaining might actually advance, rather than
undermine, public interests in crime control and just punishment.117 We
may add that the victim may have a particular interest in the accuracy of
the outcome, in that justice should be done with the person who harmed
him. If a plea bargain is necessary, it should be conducted fairly and, with
the due consideration of the victims whose complaint initiates the
process.118
In sum victims’ participation, which may be regarded as a major
departure from the adversarial system, may actually help to restore many of
the adversarial system’s advantages, forsaken under a plea bargains regime.
Furthermore, victim’s participation may add transparency to an otherwise
opaque process.

IV. NEW FRAMEWORK FOR VICTIM’S PARTICIPATION
In the last two chapters, we analyzed the overall importance of victims’
participation in plea bargains, the existing normative framework and the
gap between the seemingly progressive legislation and its surprisingly
small impact on the legal arena. Next, we turn to a brief review of some
113. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981). The right of due process is at the center of Mashaw’s argument.
The question whether victims enjoy such right is beyond the scope of this article, but should
be mentioned here as a point for future discussion.
114. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble With Trials; The Trouble With Us, 105 YALE L.J.
825 (1995). See also Gazal-Ayal & Riza, supra note 6, at 152, 158 (stressing that much of
the relevant economic literature has concentrated on tools to control potential deviations of
prosecutors from the public interest).
115. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 192.
116. Bibas, supra note 83, at 2470–86. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 UNI. OF PENN. REV. 101, 138 (2009).
117. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 323.
118. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 191.
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suggested solutions that have been offered in literature, and suggest a new
framework for victims’ participation.
A. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE LACKING VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION
Several suggestions have been made as to how best to structure the
victim’s role in plea agreements, mostly before the 2004 CVRA. For
example, a very early proposal suggested private prosecution as a remedy
for prosecutorial inaction.119 This is mainly relevant in cases where the
prosecution fails to bring charges. Such proposals are less than tempting,
considering the many benefits of the state-run criminal process. Among
them is the undue burden that may be inflicted on a victim who has to
conduct her own process.120 A solution should then be found within the
CJS.
O’Hear suggested mandatory consultation and prosecutorial
guidelines as a victims’ rights measure.121 It seems that the most radical
proposal has been Fletcher’s, who supported giving victims the right to
veto a plea agreement as a full party to the proceedings.122 This suggestion
may trigger the common concern when victims’ rights are discussed,
blurring the line between “private vengeance” and public interest.123 The
idea of victims’ right to veto a plea agreement has been opposed, as the
prosecution should be free to act ‘in the interest of the state.’124
Furthermore, it could lead to pressure on the victim.
We suggest a different framework intended to bring a simpler solution.
In this framework, we use nudge theory, which strikes a delicate balance
between private and public regulation by paternalistically nudging people
through a choice-architecture that does not eliminate or reduce freedom of
choice.125 Nudge theory is supposed to suggest simple solutions to the
complicated problem of the lacking cooperation of the crime victims in the
plea agreements, while not compromising the freedom of choice of the
other actors in the criminal procedure.

119. Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65
YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
120. The same rational will lead to a dismissal of alternative proceedings as a replacement
to the criminal process, a solution to the CJS’s failures: Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional
Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right Not to be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L.
REV. 63, 97–107 (1984).
121. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 323.
122. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 193, 247.
123. Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 1606–07
(1996).
124. ABA, Model law, op.cit. comment. Supra note 59; Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice?
Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1596, 1606-07 (1996); State of Oregon v. McDonnell,
794 P.2d 780 (Or. 1990).
125. Jin-Won Jung, Nudging Websites: A Proposal for a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme to
Enforce Online Copyright 8 ISJLP 149, 153 (2012).
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B. NUDGE THEORY AND ITS COMPATIBILITY TO PLEA BARGAINS
According to the Behavioral Law and Economics field of research,
analysis of law should be linked with what we have learned about human
behavior and choice.126 Thus, the task is to explore how “real people”
differ from homo economicus, namely from the notion that people think or
choose unfailingly well (hereinafter: “Econs”). People can be said to
display bounded rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest
that draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable
preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of
information.127 It is now well established that people make decisions on
the basis of heuristic devices or rules of thumb that can lead to systematic
errors, and that people display various biases and aversions that can lead to
inaccurate perceptions.128 Thus, the understanding of “real people”
behavior should have a bearing on law.
Nudge theory goes within this framework. A nudge is any factor that
significantly alters the behavior of humans, even though Econs would
ignore it. Econs respond primarily to incentives. Humans respond to
incentives too, but they are also influenced by nudges.129 The false
assumption of the theorists of nudge challenge, is that people make choices
that are in their best interest or at the very least are better than the choices
that would be made by someone else. Hence, nudge theory involves choice
architecture and claim that a certain degree of paternalism should be
acceptable even to those who embrace freedom of choice most.130 Thus, a
nudge is any aspect of choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing
their economic incentives.131
Behavioral economists generally focus on the mean, not the end. Their
goal is to create choice architecture that will make it more likely that
people will promote their own ends as they themselves understand them.132
Moreover, behavioral economists generally favor soft rather than hard
paternalism (a jail sentence and a fine count as hard paternalism, whereas a
disclosure policy, a warning and a default rule count as soft paternalism).133
Thus, nudges generally fall in the categories of means paternalism and soft
126. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (ed. by Cass R.
Sunstein, 2000) 1, 2.
127. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (ed. by Cass R. Sunstein, 2000)
11, 14.
128. Sunstein, supra note 126, at 3.
129. RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE – IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2009) 8.
130. Id. at 11.
131. Id. at 6.
132. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (Yale
University Press, 2012) 19.
133. Id. at 20.
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paternalism.134 However, paternalistic interventions are better understood
in terms of a continuum from hardest to softest, with the points marked in
accordance to the magnitude of the costs imposed on choosers by choice
architects.135
People need nudges for decisions that are difficult, for which they do
not get prompt feedback, and when they have trouble translating aspects of
the situation into terms that they can easily understand.136 While required
choice is sometimes the best way to go, people would much prefer to have
a good default, especially when choice is complicated, difficult and
complex.137 In circumstances with high decision costs, possible choice
fatigue, or a low probability of undesirable consequences, research suggests
that decision makers are likely to choose a default option that allows them
to devote minimal energy to their decisions.138
Plea agreements are the paradigm case of complicated decisions, in
which the decision makers suffer from time constraints and tend to choose
the default option. The repetitive actors in the game are the prosecutors
and the judges. The prosecutors have many cases to deal with and they tend
to make the plea agreements in order to facilitate the need to administer the
trial and the case evidence. The judge needs to decide quickly and tends to
choose the default option of approving the agreement, which allows her to
devote minimum energy to the decision. The victim, for whom the case is
the “only case,” is forgotten. Not only is this an infringement upon her
rights, but she also does not have the chance to challenge the process and
add some questions to the equation. As Michael O’Hear stressed,
by this point in the criminal process, the plea agreement has
already gained considerable momentum, and even when the
victims raise significant concerns, the judge may be quite reluctant
to reject the agreement, which would require everyone to expand
more effort on a case that otherwise appeared ripe for prompt
solution.139
Choice architecture can help induce greater deliberation by actors and
is especially important for changing routine behaviors. Deliberation can
facilitate a critical thought that gives actors a pause before engaging in
habitual behaviors and can thereby alter actors’ perspectives on how
particular tasks should be performed. Such deliberation can be prompted
by nudges that require actors to make choices instead of resorting to a
familiar default option. Creating nudges that force actors to make choices
134. SUNSTEIN, supra note 132, at 20.
135. Id. at 56–57.
136. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 129, at 74.
137. Id. at 88–89.
138. Michael P. Kenstowicz, The Imposition of Discretionary Supervised Release
Conditions: Nudging Judges to Follow the Law 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1446 (2015).
139. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 324.
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is particularly significant when an actor intends to deviate from routine
behaviors but experiences significant time constraints.140
Law meets nudging in two sets of circumstances.
The first
circumstance is when private entities nudge their customers, employees or
donors into desired behavior (buying more, walking more, giving more
money.) The second circumstance occurs when public entities themselves
seek to nudge citizens into certain behavior. This typically requires
legislation, regulation, or authorization.141
The current state of affair does not offer an accommodating climate for
victims’ participation.142 However, as explained, the value of victims’
participation in the process is not only in their ability to express their
interests. A great value lies in the chance to induce greater deliberation by
CJS’s professionals and a deviation from routine behavior, i.e., a prompt
acceptance of plea agreements. Equally important, it can also offer a
meaningful safeguard on the prosecutorial discretion. In other words, CJS
professionals should be nudged into including victims in the proceedings,
and victims should be nudged to fulfill their rights. Hence, we continue
with suggesting a nudge toolbox intended to make the repeated participants
in the CJS take into account the victim’s opinion in plea-bargains.

V. NUDGE TOOLBOX
An optimal nudge toolbox will address the prosecutors, the judge and
the victim. The toolbox will not amend the contents of the statutory
victims’ rights in plea agreements, but is aimed at effecting the way those
rights are administered by structuring the discretion of the other
participants in the CJS in accordance to the principles outlined in the
previous chapter. The nudge toolbox will impose some seemingly minor
duties on the CJS’s participants, which will not diminish their discretion,
but instead induce greater deliberation. In that, the toolbox will be a
mechanism of architecture of human behavior in order to subtly shift the
parties towards a better inclusion of victims in the process. The following
suggestions do not require an amendment of the CVRA, but they highlight
the importance of amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.143

140. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 129, at 88–89.
141. Anne-Lisse Sibony & Alberto Alemanno, The Emergence of Behavioral PolicyMaking: A European Perspective in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1, 10–
11 (Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lisse Sibony ed., 2015).
142. O’Hear, supra note 20.
143. Two previous amendments have referred to victims, in a roundabout way: The 1974
amendment that justified pleas as they “may protect the innocent victim of a crime against
the trauma of direct and cross-examination,” and the 1985 amendment providing that the
defendant be notified of the courts’ power to order restitution. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. In this
our suggestion follows early meaningful calls to amend the rules, notably that of Cassell.
See Cassell, supra note 5.
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The CVRA provides a broad framework for victims’ participation,
allowing the victim ‘to be heard’ without regulating the details of this right.
It does not elaborate on the right to confer with the prosecutor or the right
to be heard in court. In addition, it requires the prosecutor to make the
‘best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the
rights,’ which is yet another requirement set in vague terms.144 Thus, it
may be claimed that the CVRA provides standards that are general in
nature, and rules that are needed to make the rights operative.145 Kaplow
found that
[T]he central factor influencing the desirability of rules and
standards is the frequency with which a law will govern
conduct. If conduct will be frequent, the additional costs
of designing rules — which are borne once — are likely to
be exceeded by the savings realized each time the rule is
applied.”146
Hence, since plea agreements dominate the CJS – rules are needed to
provide and assure victims’ participation.
As mentioned above, the federal rules were slightly amended in 2008
to require judges to provide victims present in court the opportunity to be
heard during sentencing.14766 However, the CVRA Subcommittee of the
Criminal Rules Advisory Committee, rejected these suggestions, (notably
Cassell’s), to meaningful amendments of victims’ rights related rules.148
Cassell argued that the Advisory Committee should broaden its vision of
the proper role for crime victims and recommended far more expansive
victim protections in order to comply with the CVRA.149
Such
amendments would have also affected victims’ rights in plea bargains. The
Subcommittee’s reluctance emanated from its decision that “they should be
somewhat conservative in their approach and not create rights beyond those
provided by the Act.”150 The price of this conservatism is that there are
articulable provisions in law without the preconditions to enforce them.
Thus, the CVRA provisions become much less meaningful than they could
be, and victims’ interests are not reflected as well as they should be.

144. CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006).
145. For the distinction between standards and rules, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 121–137 (1961); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 3609 FACULTY
SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 14–46 (1967); Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81
YALE L.J. 823, 846–47 (1972).
146. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
621 (1992).
147. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h)(i)(4)(B).
148. Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules Minutes (Oct. 24 & 25, 2005, Santa Rosa,
California) at www.uscourts.gov/file/14793/download.
149. Cassell, supra note 5, at 886–91.
150. Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules Minutes, supra note 148.
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The advantage of a nudge toolbox is that it will not confine the
prosecutor’s discretion, since it keeps the current boundaries of the
discretion intact.151 As Kahan explained, “norms stick when lawmakers try
to change them with ‘hard shoves’ but yield when lawmakers apply ‘gentle
nudges.’”152 The tools will nudge the prosecutor to approach the victim,
inform her and give her a meaningful opportunity to express her view prior
to sealing the plea. Not only will it make the fulfillment of the right to
confer and express a view more precise, it will also ascertain that the
provisions are enforced.
Our basic suggestions are first, a rule that ensures that the process is
fully documented;153 and secondly, a default rule according to which a
judge will deliver a decision only after reviewing this document.154
As for the prosecution, right from the very early stages of plea
negotiations, documenting all contact with the victim in writing will
necessitate a significant degree of attention and consideration. As Kellogg
stressed, writing is a special form of thinking, the making of meaning.155
Kellogg even regarded “thinking and writing as twins of mental life.”156
The prosecutor will have to record her communication with the victim, and
will, eventually, file a certification of compliance to the court. This
document will include answers to five questions:
1. Is it a “victim offense”?
2. Have the best efforts been made to inform the victim
about the plea agreement and her right to express a
view?
3. Has the victim been heard prior to the sealing of the
plea agreement? If not — why?
4. If the victim expressed her view — what was it?157
5. Has the victim’s view been taken into consideration
when deciding the plea agreement?
151. The purpose of confining discretion is to keep discretionary power within designated
boundaries. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE – A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 97
(1971).
152. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000).
153. Cf. Kenstowicz, supra note 138, at 1443 (suggesting in relation to conditions of
release from prison, to omit standard conditions from form AO-245B, in order to nudge
sentencing judges to actively consider and rewrite the standard conditions imposed on
particular defendants).
154. Default rules are a tool of choice in behavioral toolbox. See Sibony & Alemanno,
supra note 141, at 14. For an overview of default rules as tools, see Eric J. Johnson &
Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY
417, 417–18 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
155. RONALD T. KELLOGG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITING 3 (1999).
156. Id. at 13.
157. In several states, the court is required to accept the prosecution’s certification that it
conferred with the victim or that an effort was made, before the plea may be accepted.
However, it does not necessarily include the content of the victim’s view. See Bloof, et al.,
supra note 56, at 423.
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Thus, the prosecutor will be less likely to resort to the easy option of
reaching a quick plea bargain. The simple task of filing a form will lead to
a more deliberate process. Moreover, it is likely not only to promote the
victims’ participation at the later stages, but the victims’ view will tend to
affect the preliminary plea bargains negotiations.
The implementation of victims’ rights at the initial stage of
negotiations is of particular importance. It may be claimed, as O’Hear did,
that expressing a victim’s view in court may be too late, as the plea has
already gathered momentum.158 O’Hear rightly contended that the judge
might be quite reluctant to reject the agreement, even where the victim
raises significant reservations. The defendant, too, is likely to take it into
consideration when negotiating the plea, as well as the prosecution.
Coupled with the mentioned research that found that victims’ involvement
in pleas led to greater levels of victims’ satisfaction, we argue that
meaningful victims’ rights will eventually lead to more balanced pleas by
taking into consideration victims’ as well as defendants’ interests, so that it
would not necessarily lead to more contentions in court.159
The need to file the document will ensure, in effect, that the prosecutor
shall make reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider
the victims' views about, any proposed plea negotiations.160 Thus, it helps
to implement not only a victim's right to be heard at plea proceedings, but
also the vaguely defined right to “confer with the attorney for the
government” and to be “treated with fairness.” As the overwhelming
majority of federal criminal cases are resolved by a plea, a conference
between the victim and the prosecutor regarding the plea will be critical in
most cases. Many state laws that direct prosecutors to consult with victims
have recognized this.161
As for the victim, she is more likely to know about her rights when
approached by the prosecutor, thus the suggestion advances the
implementation of the victims’ right to be heard regarding a plea. If she so
chooses, she may be heard. If she is not interested, it would not be for lack
of means, representation or any other immaterial factor.
The judge, in her turn, according to the new default rule we suggest,
will need to consider the prosecutors’ certificate of compliance before
deciding about sealing the agreement. Thus, the default rule is that
agreement is not approved without knowing the opinion of the victim. The

158. O’Hear, supra note 20, at 324.
159. Some research has found that a considerable number of victims who have been
involved in plea bargains had been satisfied with the outcome. Rebrovich, supra note 62.
160. Cassell, supra note 5, at 888.
161. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06 (2013) (“If the prosecutor fails to confer with
the victim at any of those times, the court, if informed of the failure, shall note on the record
the failure and the prosecutor’s reasons for the failure”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4419
(2016).
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suggestion conforms with Cassell’s proposition that prosecutors and
victims' attorneys should be required to advise the court whenever they are
aware that the victim objects to a proposed plea agreement.162 It also
follows the logic behind Cassell’s proposition that the court should address
any victim present when a plea is taken to determine whether the victim
wishes to make a statement and to consider the victim's view before
accepting a plea.163 The suggested toolbox is also in line with defendants’
rights advocates who call to forbid guilty pleas at first appearance, thus
allowing the defendants, as well as the victim, time to react.164
Our proposal for a judiciously used court certification can achieve the
same goals by using “softer” means. It, too, will eliminate the uncertainty
that emanates from the fact that many victims lack the assistance of
counsel, and thus ensures that the victim's right to be heard is vindicated.
As the experience in several states shows, “[c]ourt certification of
compliance efforts provides a system of checks and balances that can help
preserve victims’ consultation rights without placing undue burden on the
criminal justice process.”165 It will put into effect the implicit obligation of
the CVRA that the prosecutors will communicate a victim's objection to the
court.166
Furthermore, as in the case of the prosecutors, it will presumably nudge
the judges into allocating the victim’s view a more thorough consideration
in her decisions. As we explained, one of the basic current problems in
pleabargains is that judges do not possess any information beyond that
which is given to them when the plea is presented. Our proposal makes it
more likely that the judge, retaining her full discretion, will be exposed to
the victim’s viewpoint and the questions that might arise.167
One might argue that the proposed solution is too soft and may leave
intact the situation whereby the prosecution presents the court with a
selective version of the truth, aimed at promoting the plea agreement. In a
sense it can be compared to the critique of another nudge tool — disclosure
requirements.
These are meant to inform, not displace, people’s
162. Cassell, supra note 5, at 889.
163. Cassell, at 886-91.
164. Bibas, supra note 7, at 1155. A similar point, from defendants’ point of view, was
made by Work in relation to “exploding offers.” See Work, supra note 6, at 486.
165. OVC Archive, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin
7/2.html#go4. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4423 (2000). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
1173 (2000).
166. See State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (2002) (holding that the prosecutor was obliged, as
an officer of the court, to inform the court about the victim’s wish to be heard in opposition
to a plea).
167. United States v. BP Products North America Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 727 (2009)
(“The purpose of the conferral right is not to give the victims a right to approve or
disapprove a proposed plea in advance or to participate in the plea negotiations. The purpose
of the reasonable right to confer is for victims to provide information to the government,
obtain information from the government, and to form and express their views to the
government and court.”).
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understanding of which choices will promote their welfare. As Sunstein
pointed out, the complexities are first, a selective disclosure of information
will often affect the understanding; and second, the framing of information
matters.168 However, the suggested nudge toolbox is likely to diminish the
extent of the existing problem. Our suggestion is also in line with Work’s
analysis that accountability and institutional design are more promising
reforms than external regulation of the prosecution.169 If lessons can be
learned from the different realms that nudge tools have been used in — we
can be cautiously optimistic.170
However, we should be aware of the fact that some nudges are
ineffective, or at least less effective than expected. In a recent article,171
Sunstein identifies two reasons why this might be so: strong contrary
preferences on the part of the chooser, who will therefore opt out, and
counter-nudges in the form of compensating behavior on the part of those
whose interests are at stake.172 The CJS system has a strong preference to
seal agreements. There is also a risk that the default rule will influence the
desired conduct (judges will demand the documents), but it will also
produce a compensating behavior, in that judges will easily approve the
agreements because the victims have been heard. This compensation will
nullify the overall effect.173
Since architecture of human behavior may be unpredictable, a solution
should be evidence based. Therefore, the proposal should be the subject of
a pilot program, and be assessed and reviewed. Sunstein offers three
answers to nudge failure: doing nothing, trying a different kind of nudge,
or undertaking a more aggressive approach, or going beyond a nudge.174
Indeed, when third-party effects are involved, in our case the victims, the
ineffectiveness of nudges provides a good reason to consider stronger
measures.175 In any case, if the pilot of the nudge toolbox does not work, at
least we will gain important knowledge about the participants’ behavior,
enabling a new consideration.

168. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 85
(2012).
169. Work, supra note 6, at 158.
170. See, e.g., Karsten Schmidt et al., Nudging Smoke In Airports: A Case Study in
Nudging as A Method, INUDGEYOU, http://inudgeyou.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/
08/Nudging-Smoke-in-Airports.pdf; DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE UNIT (2015)
(describing seemingly small and subtle solutions that have led to huge improvements across
tax, healthcare, pensions, employment, crime reduction, energy conservation, and economic
growth).
171. Cass. R. Sunstein, Nudge that Fail (preliminary draft July 18, 2016), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2809658.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Cf. d. at 19.
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id. at 20.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Currently the federal law (CVRA) provides victims with meaningful
rights of participation. The proposals made in this article are meant to
bridge the gap between these seemingly sufficient rights and a reality in
which victims might still be marginalized. This gap may be explained by
the prosecution’s vast discretion and dominance in the process. At the
same time, victims are powerless to enforce their rights to participate, and
this powerlessness eliminates the potential for true confrontation.
An example of the importance of involving victims in plea agreements,
have recently been given in a Utah child abuse case. A judge refused to
accept a plea where the victims’ parents had not been allocated the right to
confer with the prosecutor and a very lenient plea had been struck behind
their back.176 Judge Randall Skanchy rejected the agreement after the
mothers of the three children voiced their objections to the deal and
described the injuries their children had suffered. One of the mothers
voiced frustration with the prosecutors and praised the judge's decision: “I
think he actually listened to us”, she said, “we haven't gotten questions
answered from day one, we’ve just been passed off.”177 Another mother
said that in light of the injury to her daughter and the others, she did not
believe the plea deal was strong enough, but she would have supported a
plea deal with sufficient consequences and an admission of guilt.178
This story demonstrates the core issues analyzed in this article. Despite
the existence of statutory victims’ rights, and the importance of victims’
involvement in pleas for the victims, for the CJS and for society — victims
are still not always perceived as rightful participants. The mothers’
complaints exemplify the secondary victimization caused by their
exclusion from the process. The judge’s acceptance of their reservations
and the resulting rejection of the plea demonstrates the value of information
and the results of the lack of it. The rejection of the plea emphasizes that
defendants do not have a legitimate right in the lower sentence offered by a
plea, when it is an unduly favorable bargain, resting on partial
information.179 Perhaps most importantly though, the mother’s heartfelt
statement shows that victims do not necessarily oppose plea agreements.
They only want to take part in the process and voice their concerns.
As a solution, we turn to nudge theory, which has almost never been
used in criminal law, but is particularly advantageous for the discussed
issue. Nudge theory involves choice architecture and claims that a certain

176. See McKenzie Romero, Judge Rejects No-Jail Plea Deal for Day Care Operator
Charged with Abusing 3 Toddlers, DESERT NEWS (June 14, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://m.deseret
news.com/article/865656220/Judge-rejects-no-jail-plea-deal-for-day-care-operator-chargedwith- abusing-3-toddlers.html?pg=all.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Welling, supra note 29, at 312.
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degree of paternalism should be acceptable even to those who most
embrace freedom of choice. Thus, a nudge is any aspect of choice
architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or abolishing their discretion. Choice architecture
can help to induce greater deliberation by actors and is especially important
for changing routine behaviors. We argue that deliberation can facilitate a
critical thought by the prosecutors and the judges, and can alter their
perspectives on how plea bargains should be performed, from the initial
negotiations to the court.
For that reason, we suggested the development of a nudge toolbox that
will nudge the prosecutor to approach the victim, inform her, and give her a
meaningful opportunity to express her view prior to sealing the plea. The
main rules we suggested ensure that the process is fully documented and
that a decision is made only following the presentation of this document.
The rules do not alter the prosecutor’s discretion but structures its
administration. Recording all contact with the victim will necessitate a
significant degree of attention and consideration, and will diminish the
tendency to resort to the default option of sealing quick agreements. The
judge too operates in circumstances, where she is likely to resort to the
default option of a swift approval of agreements. These circumstances
include the case load and the need to deliver decisions in due time. Being
presented with structured information regarding the victim’s view will lead
the judge to a more deliberate decision, without limiting her discretion.
This apparently simple and minor change, has a potential to make
major contribution towards the implementation of the broadly defined
CVRA rights and to the inclusion of victims in plea agreements.
Furthermore, it will answer some of the strongest critiques of plea bargains
by making the process more transparent. This will not necessarily lead to
fewer plea agreements, but it will hopefully lead to more balanced ones,
reflecting all the relevant interests. The prosecution and the defendant will
have an interest in reaching an agreement that will not be rejected by the
court. Thus, victim input may contribute to what may be seen as a fairer
conclusion of the plea agreement.

